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ABSTRACT
We analyze the characteristics of optimal dynamics in an economy in
which neither prices nor wages adjust instantaneously and lump-sum taxes
are unavailable as a source of government finance. We then propose that
monetary and fiscal policy should be coordinated to satisfy a pair of
simple specific targeting rules, a rule for (wage) inflation and a relationship
that links the growth of real wages to past price and wage developments,
and output gap dynamics. We show that such simple rule-based conduct of
policy can do remarkably well in replicating the dynamics of the economy
under optimal policy following a given shock.
JEL Classification: E52, E61, E63.
Keywords: Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy, Timeless Perspective,
Nominal Rigidity, Simple Targeting Rules.1. Introduction
In this paper, we propose simple ￿ speci￿c targeting rules￿in the spirit of Svensson
(2002, 2003) to characterize ￿ desirable￿policy in a New Keynesian economy with
staggered wage and price contracts, and endogenous tax dynamics. In our complex
analytical framework, which is an extension of Erceg et al. (2000) and Benigno
and Woodford (2003, 2004), it is not possible to characterize optimal policy using
simple analytical solutions. Our approach of looking at joint monetary-￿scal
targeting rules represents an innovative way of approximating optimal policy that
allows us to obtain an excellent match with the optimal dynamics of the economy
following shocks.
Our work is also related to Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2005) and Chugh (2006)
who studied jointly optimal monetary-￿scal strategies in frameworks involving
costly price and wage adjustment. By doing so, they extended upon a stream
of literature on monetary and ￿scal policy that begins with Lucas and Stokey￿ s
(1983) ￿ exible-price framework with complete asset markets and has gradually
evolved over time to include asset market imperfections (Aiyagari et al., 2002)
and price stickiness (Benigno and Woodford, 2003, Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe,
2004a and Siu, 2004).
Our analysis is distinct in the class of papers with price and wage rigidity in
two important aspects. First, it follows the linear-quadratic approach of Erceg et
al. (2000) and Benigno and Woodford (2004) to analyze jointly optimal monetary-
￿scal strategies. This allows us to characterize optimal policy using a quadratic
objective function, which is appealing from a practical point of view, and to
directly compare its properties with the policy objectives derived in a similar
way in the simpler economies of Erceg et al. (2000) and Benigno and Woodford
(2004). Second, we depart from the conventional approach, used among others in
2Erceg et al. (2000) and Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004b, 2005), of looking for
simple rules for policy instruments to approximate optimal policy. We propose
a simple characterization of policy as an approximation to the optimal policy at
a higher level of generality, as discussed in Svensson (2002, 2003) and Svensson
and Woodford (2005). We concentrate on ￿ speci￿c targeting rules￿ . These rules
o⁄er a simple joint policy target for monetary and ￿scal policy makers. We show
that well-speci￿ed simple speci￿c targeting rules can guide policy very well so
that when combined with the structural model, the resulting dynamics of the
economy is a close approximation of the dynamics under optimal policy following
a given shock. Such simple characterization of policy has thus the potential to
outperform simple (ad hoc) instrument rules. In other words, conduct of policy
based on conventionally considered simple instrument rules would lead to excessive
welfare losses some of which can be eliminated if policy is characterized, as we
propose, at a higher level of generality. We demonstrate this point by deriving
￿ expectations-based reaction functions￿(Evans and Honkapohja, 2006) consistent
with the simple targeting rules and showing that they are much more complex
than the conventionally considered instrument rules. At the same time, from a
practical point of view, characterization of policy via the targeting rules proposed
here is no less veri￿able than the conduct of policy based on commitment to
instrument rules. Speci￿c targeting rules are also equally easy to build into
macroeconomic decision frameworks. As spelled out in detail in Svensson (2002,
2003), characterizing policy using targets rather than simple rules for instruments
is also more consistent with the use of judgement in policy making. On the other
hand, the quality of approximation provided by speci￿c targeting rules is prone
to be a⁄ected by the dynamic structure of the economy modelled. Nevertheless,
and especially given the reluctance of policy makers to commit themselves to an
explicit instrument rule, and the popularity of target-based conduct of monetary
3policy, we consider speci￿c targeting rules an attractive and policy-relevant way
of characterizing ￿ good￿policy.
In our sticky-price, sticky-wage framework, we ￿nd that the central
government￿ s policy objective includes a wage in￿ ation volatility term in addition
to the objective of stabilizing price in￿ ation and output gap volatility. Hence, this
result from Erceg et al. (2000) and Benigno and Woodford (2004) carries over
to a situation when monetary policy has ￿scal implications too.1 We also ￿nd
that the relative weights in the policy objective are little changed compared with
Benigno and Woodford (2004). As expected, optimal nominal wage volatility
falls dramatically with wage-stickiness and this causes real wages to be much
more stable compared with the sticky-price but ￿ exible-wage model of Benigno
and Woodford (2003), for instance. The presence of nominal wage stickiness also
introduces endogenous persistence into the dynamics of the model. In contrast
to the ￿ exible-wage Benigno and Woodford (2003) economy, our endogenous
variables converge to their (new) steady state levels only gradually, even if the
disturbance that initially causes the economy to abandon its steady state is purely
transitory. Non-stationarity in the dynamics of public debt, tax rate and the
output gap carries over from Benigno and Woodford (2003) as the optimal solution
to an economy where wage stickiness is present in addition to price stickiness. We
￿nd some support for the claim that price stickiness is the single most important
factor justifying price stability as the principal goal of monetary policy (Schmitt-
GrohØ and Uribe, 2005). We also show that it is enough for one of the markets to
be imperfectly ￿ exible to make the policy of strict price- and wage-level targeting
undesirable.
1Adding further frictions to the model such as rule-of-thumb behaviour, various indexation
mechanisms or habit persistence would be likely to a⁄ect the nature of the policy objective, as
in Amato and Laubach (2003), for instance. Our purpose here is to examine the e⁄ect of the
absence of lump-sum taxation on the policy objective and optimal dynamics in isolation.
4We then propose that the branches of central government authority operating
in our sticky-price, sticky-wage economic framework should coordinate their e⁄orts
to gradually stabilize nominal wage growth and also make sure that a simple
relationship linking the growth in the real wage rate to past price and wage
in￿ ation and the dynamics of the output gap is satis￿ed. We rank alternative
policies in the family of policies given by these simple targeting rules. Benigno
and Woodford (2006b) discuss in great detail the issues associated with ranking
suboptimal rules in frameworks such as ours. The method for ranking suboptimal
simple rules proposed in Benigno and Woodford (2006b), which entails separating
the trend and the cyclical components of di⁄erence-stationary series (output
gap) and ranking of policies implying the same trend component using a similar
decomposition of welfare, cannot be applied in our case, since the policies we wish
to examine do not converge to the same long-run outcome (i.e. have di⁄erent trend
components). Instead, we identify the best policy in our class using a simple grid
search over a (constrained) range of parameters to obtain the parameter values
that would calibrate our rules so that the implied impulse response functions for
the variables in the policy objective come closest to those describing the behaviour
of the optimal economy following the same shock. A similar criterion was shown
to be a good alternative to analyses based directly on utility-based measures of
welfare in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2005).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the microeconomic
foundations of our sticky-price, sticky-wage model. In Section 3, we outline the
corresponding macroeconomic model and discuss the policy makers￿objective.
We also examine the feasibility of some simple policy strategies. In Section
4, we derive the ￿ timelessly optimal￿ plan. In Section 5, we propose a pair
of simple targeting rules to approximate optimal policy and analyze how the
economy performs relative to the optimal economy under such a characterization
5of policy. Since the steps involved in deriving the model of the macroeconomy
and the approximate Ramsey problem directly follow from Benigno and Woodford
(2003, 2004), the Appendix to this paper only lists some key relationships between
parameters and variables. The derivations of the structural relationships and of
the policy objective are available upon request from the author.
2. The microeconomic foundations
Our model economy is inhabited by an in￿nite number of identical households
of measure one. The representative household derives positive utility from total
consumption C of di⁄erentiated goods and incurs disutility from supplying labour














0 < ￿ < 1 is the subjective discount rate. The household supplies industry-
speci￿c labour to j industries. As explained in Woodford (2003, Chapter 3), this
is equivalent to assuming that each household is employed in one type of industry
only and the existence of perfect capital markets to enable risk-sharing across
















where e ￿ and !w are constants. In the utility function, b Gt stands for a shock to
government expenditures, which is the only source of disturbance in our model.
6Consumption of individual goods is aggregated into a total consumption index










in which "p is a constant and represents the elasticity of substitution across goods
in the goods market. Minimization of an expenditure function subject to (2.5)
yields an expression for the optimal consumption of good i. A standard income
identity then implies the demand function















We introduce imperfect competition into the labour market in a similar
way. We assume the existence of a continuum of monopolistically competitive
households, supplying di⁄erentiated labour to the production sector. The total
quantity of labour used in the production of good i is an aggregate of di⁄erent










in which "w is the elasticity of substitution in the labour market. It is assumed
that there exists an employment agency that bundles together di⁄erent types of
labour needed in the production of a good i exactly in the same way as the ￿rm
producing that good would want it. Cost minimization by wage-taking ￿rms
subject to (2.8) yields the demand for labour of type j















Note that aggregate labour supply in the economy can then be expressed as
Ht =
R 1
0 Ht (i)di. Combining this with the production function and (2.6) yields

































2.1. The wage-setting decision
Each household maximizes the di⁄erence between the utility derived from wage






(1 ￿ ￿w;t)wt (j)ht (wt (j)) ￿ ￿(ht (wt (j))): (2.15)
Moreover, it does so in a forward-looking way, evaluating an expected stream of
net utility gains. As in Erceg et al. (2000), we assume a wage setting mechanism
of the type put forward by Calvo (1983) with ￿w 2 (0;1) denoting the probability
8of not being able to adjust wages in any period. The intertemporal ￿rst-order


































in which ￿w is the rate of distortive tax on wage income. Under the baseline Calvo
framework, wT (j) = wt (j) for all T. This implies that ￿rms will charge the price
chosen in period t, if they do not receive a signal that they can adjust their prices
in period T (with probability ￿T￿t
w ). Qt;T is a standard stochastic asset pricing
kernel that can be derived from a simple household utility maximization problem
subject to a ￿ ow budget constraint equating wage and dividend income together
with asset returns to consumption and change in assets. ￿w is the wage markup





In a symmetric equilibrium, suppliers of labour who change their prices in period t
set a common wage so that wt (j) = w￿
t. We can now solve the ￿rst-order condition








































































where ￿w;t = Wt
Wt￿1. It is now also easy to show that
￿w;t = ￿w￿
"w(1+!w)










2.2. The price-setting decision
Firms maximize a future stream of pro￿ts with wages being the only cost item in
their balance sheets. The nominal pro￿t of ￿rm i is written as
zt (i) = pt (i)yt (i) ￿ WtHt (i): (2.21)
Here, we also assume a baseline Calvo price-setting mechanism with ￿p being
the probability of having to leave prices unchanged in a given period. The
representative ￿rm is then choosing the optimal price, taking the wage index




























For pt (i) = p￿



























































which together with (2.24) implies the following implicit de￿nition of price






























Monetary and ￿scal authorities, the two branches of the central government,
coordinate their actions to ensure that social welfare given by (2.1) is maximized.
The government raises revenues via distortive taxes on wage income to ￿nance
exogenous government spending G. It issues one-period nominal bonds to bridge
the gap between taxation and spending. The government therefore faces the ￿ ow
budget constraint
Bt = (1 + it￿1)Bt￿1 ￿ Pt￿t; (2.30)
where B denotes the volume of one-period nominal bonds issued by the ￿scal
authority, ￿t is the t-period primary budget surplus and it is the nominal interest











The nonlinear Ramsey problem is then to maximize (2.1) subject to the ￿rst-
order conditions from the optimization problems of the consumers and ￿rms,
the ￿scal solvency requirement, the dynamics of the price and wage dispersion,
and the relevant initial and terminal conditions, alongside appropriate (initial)
commitments that ensure time-consistency of the solution in the absence of
full commitment.2 This problem would yield a system of nonlinear ￿rst-order
conditions. One can then solve for optimal dynamics using the nonlinear
model or linearize the nonlinear system to obtain an approximate solution. An
equivalent way of solving for the approximate optimal plan is to formulate a linear-
quadratic approximate policy problem (see Benigno and Woodford, 2003, 2006b
for a thorough treatment of a general class of problems which includes the one
considered here). In frameworks where stabilization policy has signi￿cant ￿rst-
order welfare e⁄ects, the construction of a correct second-order-accurate welfare
objective requires a second-order approximation to the structural equations. In
the next section, we present the structural elements of the approximate problem.
3. The macroeconomic model
We ￿nd that the absence of lump-sum taxation as a source of government ￿nance
does not change the nature of policy makers￿ preferences as expressed by a
2Such formulation of the policy problem is now standard and is not presented here to
economize on space.
12quadratic loss function. It follows from our setup that the monetary and ￿scal
branches of central government should conduct monetary and ￿scal policy to
























As in Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2004), yt is the welfare-relevant output gap
de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the actual and the target deviation in output b Y ￿
t .
The target deviation follows from the approximation to individual utility, hence
it is determined by preferences and is independent of policy (see the Appendix).
￿p;t stands for price in￿ ation and ￿w;t stands for nominal wage growth or wage
in￿ ation. If appropriate initial commitments are satis￿ed, this objective represents
a second-order-accurate welfare-ranking criterion, while the rest of the model is
speci￿ed with only ￿rst-order accuracy. The functional form is thus the same as in
Erceg et al. (2000) and Benigno and Woodford (2004). The objective contains a
wage-in￿ ation-stabilization term, which is absent in ￿ exible-wage frameworks such
as Benigno and Woodford (2003). As one would expect though, the coe¢ cients
as well as the target deviation in output will, in general, be di⁄erent given the
di⁄erent structural setup caused by the unavailability of lump-sum taxation.
For common parameter values, the coe¢ cients in the policy objective will be
positive, implying that the function is convex and the optimal solution that we
obtain represents a minimum from the perspective of welfare losses.
The setup presented in the previous section also implies the following structural
relationships for the economy. The supply side is characterized by
￿p;t = ￿pyt + ￿p
￿




















13Equation (3.2) is the price aggregate supply relationship. b w￿
R;t is the deviation
in the real wage rate from its steady state value that brings about the target
deviation in output without a⁄ecting the price level. Equation (3.3) is the wage
aggregate supply relationship. b ￿
￿
w;t is the deviation in the tax rate that aligns the
natural rate of output with its target level, as in Benigno and Woodford (2003).
It is determined based on the di⁄erence in the degree to which the natural and the
welfare-e¢ cient levels of output are a⁄ected by the rise in government spending.3
The dynamics of real wages is given by
b wR;t ￿ b wR;t￿1 = ￿w;t ￿ ￿p;t: (3.4)
Chugh (2006) highlights the central importance of this identity in determining the
optimal dynamics of the economy and optimal in￿ ation volatility when wages are
sticky.4 The ￿ ow government budget constraint, together with a standard Euler
equation and a transversality condition, implies the following ￿scal sustainability
condition
b bt￿1 ￿ ￿p;t ￿ ￿




















’t is again the ￿ ￿scal stress￿term introduced in Benigno and Woodford (2003).
The coe¢ cients fy;f￿; and fw are de￿ned in the Appendix. Finally, the demand
3Brie￿ y, the natural rate of output is the level of output that would prevail in an economy
with no nominal rigidities. See Woodford (2003) for a thorough treatment.
4Under staggered wage adjustment, nominal wage growth is costly in welfare terms, as it
generates an ine¢ cient allocation of resources due to wage dispersion and hence its desired
volatility will be low. Assuming that real wage dynamics is determined elsewhere in the system
and is fairly stable, in￿ ation varies only to deliver the desired path of real wages. This role of
in￿ ation, according to Chugh (2006), dominates its role of a shock absorber. Hence, he obtains
low volatility of in￿ ation to be optimal even when only wage adjustment is costly. This contrasts
with Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2005) who ￿nd prices to be optimally volatile when wages only
are in￿ exible.
14side of the economy is given by the ￿ IS￿relationship
yt = Etyt+1 ￿ ￿
￿





in which b r￿
t is the ￿ e¢ cient￿deviation in the interest rate that is consistent with the
target deviation in output. This equation follows from a standard Euler equation.
3.1. Some simple policy considerations
Erceg et al. (2000) have argued that the policy maker is able to achieve maximum
welfare￿ the Pareto optimum, as they referred to a value of zero of Lt￿ if prices
in either the product or labour market are perfectly ￿ exible. In that case, a policy
of zero in￿ ation in the ￿ non-￿ exible￿market will be consistent with maximum
welfare. Benigno and Woodford (2004), however, overturned their result showing
that the presence of cost-push shocks in economies where stabilization policy has
signi￿cant ￿rst-order welfare e⁄ects will prevent such policies being feasible.
In our model, there is a new element. Since the dynamics of the tax rate is
endogenous, the tax rate as a policy variable can be used to counteract cost-push
pressures in the economy. On the other hand, the optimal economy also has to
satisfy the constraint on government ￿nancing. Therefore, in the context of our
model, we can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. a) Perfect stabilization of nominal wages with the aim of
attaining the Pareto optimum is a feasible policy under ￿ exible prices but sticky
wages if and only if
b bt￿1 + ’t = b wR;t￿1 ￿ b w
￿
R;t for all t: (3.7)
15b) Similarly, it is feasible to engineer a policy of zero price in￿ ation to attain the
Pareto optimum under ￿ exible wages but sticky prices if and only if
b bt￿1 + ’t = 0 for all t: (3.8)
Proof a) Since prices are fully ￿ exible, the price aggregate supply relationship
is vertical and price in￿ ation volatility carries zero weight in (3.1). Price in￿ ation
￿p can then serve the purpose of maintaining
b wR;t = b w
￿
R;t for all t; (3.9)
given that ￿w;t = 0 at all times, so that with b ￿w;t = b ￿
￿
w;t for all t, zero output gaps
are realized for all t and the Pareto optimum is attained. However, price in￿ ation
is also the only means available to satisfy the ￿scal solvency constraint. With no
output gap and no ￿ tax gap￿either, (3.5) is satis￿ed if and only if
b bt￿1 + ’t = ￿p;t for all t: (3.10)
Equations (3.4), (3.9) and (3.10) lead to (3.7). With this, all constraints are
satis￿ed and the zero-in￿ ation, zero-output-gap Pareto optimum is feasible. Now
suppose
b bt￿1 + ’t 6= b wR;t￿1 ￿ b w
￿
R;t for any t. (3.11)
For the Pareto optimum to be feasible, ￿scal solvency and hence (3.10) has to be
satis￿ed. We can thus replace the left-hand side in (3.11) with ￿p;t. By (3.9),
which also must hold in the Pareto optimum, b wR;t replaces b w￿
R;t on the right-hand
side. Combining this with (3.4) leads to the contradiction ￿p;t 6= ￿p;t. Thus, if
(3.7) is not satis￿ed in any t, the Pareto optimum will not be attainable.
b) In the ￿ exible-wage case, with a vertical wage aggregate supply relationship,
￿w carries zero weight in the policy objective. It can vary freely to ensure (3.9)
is satis￿ed, given that ￿p;t = 0 at all times, so that with b ￿w;t = b ￿
￿
w;t for all t, zero
16output gaps are realized for all t. The Pareto optimum is feasible if and only if
￿scal solvency is maintained. With zero output gap, zero ￿ tax gap￿and zero price
in￿ ation, (3.5) is satis￿ed if and only if (3.8) holds. This is a formal presentation
of the argument in Benigno and Woodford (2003). ￿
Neither of the conditions (3.7) and (3.8) is likely to be satis￿ed under general
circumstances. We can therefore conclude that the presence of distortive taxes,
even though a⁄ecting the structure of the economy and of the argument, it does
not alter the principal conclusions from Benigno and Woodford (2004). Strict
price- and/or wage-level targeting remains an undesirable policy strategy in the
presence of nominal rigidity. The need to satisfy the ￿scal solvency condition
precludes the attainment of the Pareto optimum when either of the product or
labour markets is ￿ exible.
4. Optimal dynamics
It is well known that optimal policy in forward-looking rational expectation
frameworks is in general time inconsistent and so Woodford (2003) has proposed
formulating optimal policy from a timeless perspective; one should model optimal
policy as the policy that would have been intended for the current period had
such a policy been formulated far in the past. Such a perspective rules out the
possibility of policy makers ￿ exploiting￿certain initial conditions. In order to
characterize this timelessly optimal policy, we need to restrict the policy choices
for period t so that the policy maker uses the same procedure to formulate policy
as in later periods. The optimal policy is then chosen so that it satis￿es certain
initial (self-consistent) commitments, in addition to the structural equations
of the economy, and is characterized by a time-invariant policy rule. Our
policy Lagrangian thus includes commitments regarding the t-period values of
17endogenous variables the knowledge of which in period t￿1 would have in￿ uenced
the determination of the equilibrium. These commitments re￿ ect the long-run
optimal solution to the dynamics of the relevant endogenous variables. The policy
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+￿3;T [b wR;T ￿ b wR;T￿1 ￿ ￿w;T + ￿p;T]
+￿4;T
h
b bT￿1 ￿ ￿p;T ￿ ￿
￿1yT + ’T ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)fyyT ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)f￿
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￿p;t ￿ ￿2;t￿1￿w;t + ￿
￿1￿4;t￿1yt (4.1)
The ￿rst-order conditions (with T = t) form the following dynamic system
qyyt = ￿p￿1;t +
￿






























￿4;t = Et￿4;t+1: (4.6)
The optimal dynamics of the key variables can be obtained by solving a system
comprising (4.2) to (4.6) and the constraints in (4.1). Unfortunately, the
complexity of the system does not allow us to obtain closed-form solutions for




"p = "w 10
￿ 1:25




Table 4.1: Parameter values
more complex setup. Nor can we specify optimal policy at a deeper level by
deriving tractable policy targets and implied rules for monetary and ￿scal policy.
We are therefore constrained to present the optimal dynamics in the form of
numerical results. We do this below. In the next section, we shall examine
simple targeting rules that do well in generating dynamics that closely matches
the optimal dynamics.
4.1. Numerical analysis: Calibration and baseline results
We use the King and Watson (1998) algorithm to solve the dynamic system of
￿rst-order conditions and structural constraints. The parameter values used in
the calibration exercise are given in Table 4.1.
The implied steady-state value of the primary budget balance as well as
the values of the coe¢ cients in the policy objective are displayed in Table 4.2.
We see that the relative weight of output gap stabilization remains very small.
The relative weights in the objective function roughly correspond to the relative
weights obtained in the monetary policy model of Benigno and Woodford (2004).5
The system, as calibrated, satis￿es the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) stability
5Given our calibration, the corresponding coe¢ cient values in the Benigno and Woodford







Table 4.2: Steady-state values and coe¢ cients
conditions and has a unique, stable solution, which we present below.
Based on the discussion above on the optimality of simple price- and wage-level
targeting strategies, it is easy to postulate that the optimal dynamics under sticky







T=t and we shall
observe price and wage in￿ ation and non-zero output gaps. The optimal dynamics
in response to a single, serially uncorrelated positive innovation to government
spending of the magnitude of one percent of steady-state output are plotted in
Figure 4.1.6 We ￿nd that the absence of the possibility of instantaneous real-wage
adjustment introduces endogenous persistence into the optimal dynamics of the
economy. We also see that the solution includes non-stationary elements, as in
the ￿ exible-wage case of Benigno and Woodford (2003). While price and wage
in￿ ation as well as the interest rate are stationary, the output gap, real wages,
the tax rate and outstanding liabilities all converge to a new equilibrium. This
equilibrium is characterized by a higher tax rate and a lower output level. Hence,
the non-stationarity property of the optimal dynamic solution to public debt, the
tax rate and output survives in the sticky-price, sticky-wage framework as well.
The near unit root property of the solution for debt is also consistent with both
Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2005) and Chugh (2006).
6The value of 1 on the vertical axes denotes 1 percent deviation from the pre-shock steady
state. The in￿ ation and wage rates are quarterly.

























































Figure 4.1: Optimal dynamics under imperfect price and wage ￿ exibility
214.2. Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we examine how the above reported results change when one
varies the length of contracts in both product and labour markets. Benigno
and Woodford (2003) have performed similar diagrammatic sensitivity analysis in
their sticky-price, ￿ exible-wage framework. They concluded that optimal (price)
in￿ ation volatility falls dramatically for even a small degree of price stickiness.
The optimal long-run tax policy is shown to be fairly robust to the degree of price
stickiness, except for the limiting case of full ￿ exibility when taxes are optimally
stabilized at their pre-shock steady state level in the long run. They, however,
report substantial variation both in the size and the sign of the short-term response
in the tax rate.
Our results for the sticky-price, sticky-wage economy are shown in Figures 4.2
and 4.3. There are several things to note about these results. First, the optimal
response in the real wage rate is much smaller relative to the response in aggregate
production compared with the ￿ exible-wage economy at even small degrees of wage
stickiness. For any length of wage contracts, we get a subdued, hump-shaped
response in the real wage rate, which brings the dynamics of the model in line
with the empirical literature.7 Second, both price and wage in￿ ation vary with the
degree of wage stickiness but wage in￿ ation is remarkably insensitive to changes
in the contract length in the product market. Our analysis suggests optimal
price in￿ ation volatility increases considerably as one shortens the duration of
price contracts while keeping wage contract duration at the baseline length.
These results give some support to the conclusions of Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe
7Stock and Watson (1999), for instance, observe that real wages in the United States have
displayed ￿ essentially no contemporaneous comovement with the business cycle￿ . A similar point
has been made by Christiano et al. (1997, 1999). Chadha et al. (2002) also ￿nd statistically
insigni￿cant correlation between output and real wages, though the fact that this need not hold
for the entire history of UK business cycle ￿ uctuations is shown in Chadha and Nolan (2000).
22(2005) that price stickiness is the single most important distortion in the economy
justifying price stability as the central goal of monetary policy. Third, the optimal
long-run tax policy is as robust to both price and wage rigidity as it was in the
case of the sticky-price economy of Benigno and Woodford (2003). However, the
short-term response in the tax rate is sensitive to the degree of wage stickiness
but not the length of price contracts. The tax policy here is a⁄ected by the
changes in the slope of the wage aggregate supply relationship and the changes
in the costliness of wage in￿ ation resulting from changes in the duration of wage
contracts. When wages are highly rigid, the wage aggregate supply schedule is
￿ at and the impact of a given tax rise on wages is only small. At the same time,
nominal wage growth is very costly in welfare terms. Our results indicate that it is
optimal to raise taxes sharply in the short term in response to the shock, implying
that the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates. As we approach the other extreme, the aggregate
supply schedule is now steep but a given rate of wage in￿ ation is less costly. Our
analysis indicates that tax policy principally remains unchanged compared with
the case of highly rigid wages, implying that now the second e⁄ect dominates. The
intermediate values of wage stickiness then imply more tax smoothing over time,
characterized by a subdued initial response in taxes followed by slower adjustment
to the new long-run equilibrium level. Finally, we ￿nd that the degree of wage or
price stickiness has remarkably little e⁄ect on the optimal dynamics of the output
gap both in the short run and the long run.8 These observations carry important
information that we shall utilize when specifying simple targeting rules in the next
section.
8Several of the observations here are in line with Erceg et al. (2000). Their sensitivity
analysis implies that the variance of price in￿ ation in the optimal economy is more sensitive
to wage contract duration than wage in￿ ation volatility to price contract duration. They also
￿nd that the optimal variance of the output gap is pretty stable across di⁄erent combinations
of price and wage stickiness.


















































Figure 4.2: Wage contract length and optimal dynamics


























































Figure 4.3: Price contract length and optimal dynamics
255. Simple speci￿c targeting rules
The previous section has highlighted one of the considerable weaknesses of optimal
policy analysis in Ramsey-type welfare-maximizing frameworks. Even in a linear-
quadratic setup that would normally yield tractable results which enable us
to describe optimal paths and policy in terms of analytically simple solutions,
it ultimately becomes impossible to characterize optimal policy at all levels of
generality￿ in the sense of Svensson and Woodford (2005)￿ once the modelling
environment becomes more complicated. One way to analyze issues in policy
design is then to search for simple (linear) policy rules that can to some extent
replicate the dynamics of the optimal economy and produce limited welfare losses
compared with the optimal plan. In the words of Lucas (1986), such rules,
￿ though certainly less e¢ cient than a monetary [and ￿scal] policy
that reacted to real shocks in just the right way, would have welfare
consequences di⁄ering trivially from the optimum policy and, unlike
the latter, would be easy to spell out and monitor.￿
Such rules can either be ad hoc or one can employ a formal optimization
procedure to determine the parameters of a ￿ quasi-optimal￿ rule (Currie and
Levine, 1987). Erceg et al. (2000) have found simple hybrid rules that would
do well compared with the fairly complicated optimized simple rule. Schmitt-
GrohØ and Uribe (2004b, 2005) also search for suitable rules for the interest rate
and the tax rate that would approximate optimal policy.
In this section, we take a di⁄erent approach. Rather than looking for ￿ good￿
instrument rules directly, we look for suitable characterization of policy at a higher
level of generality. We identify a pair of joint policy targets which, in conjunction
with the structural equations, generate dynamics similar to the dynamics of the
optimal economy. Subsequently, we specify ￿ expectations based reaction functions￿
26for monetary and ￿scal policy following Evans and Honkapohja (2006). The
complexity of these reaction functions highlights the advantage of specifying policy
at a higher level of generality, namely that it allows us to approximate a system
with complex dynamic behaviour much more closely than simple instrument rules
would normally do. There are thus potential gains in terms of welfare associated
with the use of targeting rules as opposed to simple instrument rules.
The family of speci￿c targeting rules we found useful to examine for our
income-tax economy describes the policy makers￿aim in terms of a rule for real
wage growth as follows
b wR;t ￿ b wR;t￿1 = ￿￿￿ (￿￿w￿w;t￿1 + ￿￿p￿p;t￿1) ￿ ￿y (yt ￿ yt￿1) (5.1)
and a wage in￿ ation targeting rule
Et￿w;t+1 = ￿￿w;t; (5.2)
with 0 < ￿ < 1. ￿￿;￿￿w;￿￿p;￿y and ￿ are policy parameters, where ￿￿w and
￿￿p add up to one. We motivate this choice of targeting rules by the following
considerations. Benigno and Woodford (2003) show that optimal policy in a
sticky-price monetary-￿scal framework can be described by a pair of targeting
rules (rather than a single rule, as in monetary policy models): a future (price)
in￿ ation target and a relationship that links current in￿ ation to past in￿ ation
and the dynamics of the output gap. Benigno and Woodford (2004) solve for a
rather more complex optimal relationship in their sticky-price, sticky-wage setup
and conclude that a good approximation to optimal policy will likely entail a
dynamic relationship featuring price and wage in￿ ation as well as the output
gap. Our targeting rule (5.1) re￿ ects some of the features of their more complex
rule.9 We have also seen from the sensitivity analysis that optimal tax policy
9Adding further dynamic elements into (48) did not improve the results much more and
comes at a cost of signi￿cant reductions in the simplicity of policy speci￿cation.
27is sensitive to wage contract duration but not to the degree of price stickiness.
The same holds for nominal wage growth. It is therefore natural to think of
wage in￿ ation as a good candidate for an intermediate target in our income-
tax economy.10 Unlike in ￿ exible-wage models, there is some persistence in the
behaviour of our endogenous variables￿ including wage in￿ ation￿ in the optimal
economy, therefore, one should expect the targeting rule to be de￿ned as a gradual
adjustment process converging to a long-run target value. Hence the choice of
(5.2). It follows that the choice of this second rule will likely depend on the
nature of the tax system.11
As far as rules for instruments are concerned, it is straightforward to derive the
analogues of the ￿ expectations based reaction function￿of Evans and Honkapohja
(2006) associated with our targeting rules. For monetary policy, we have
b it = b r
￿
















The reaction function for the tax rate can be written as















(Et￿p;t+1 ￿ ￿p;t); (5.4)
10In setups with endogenous tax dynamics, the policy regarding the tax rate plays a role in
stabilizing prices through its impact on ￿rms￿marginal cost. This relationship between the tax
rate and wage in￿ ation is also clear from the wage aggregate supply relationship (35).
11In our preliminary attempts, we also experimented with a price in￿ ation target similar to
the wage in￿ ation target used, but it proved to be an inferior policy objective in our economy
relying on income tax as the source of government tax revenue. It is evident from Figure 4.3 that
a policy strategy featuring a simple in￿ ation target similar to (49) would make it very di¢ cult
to mimic the optimal economy under a shorter duration of price contracts. Such speci￿cation
might, however, be appropriate under a di⁄erent tax regime. See the concluding remarks for
further discussion.
28using (5.2). Their complexity is considerable when matched against the
instrument rules normally considered in the literature.
5.1. The ranking criterion
There are obviously numerous ways to calibrate our rules with each of the
calibrations implying di⁄erent welfare e⁄ects. Some calibrations will do better
than others and the problem is to identify the best policy in the class of policies
described by the pair of simple targeting rules. Since one of the variables in the
policy objective, namely the output gap, is non-stationary, it is not straightforward
to assess the goodness of ￿t provided by our simple targeting rules relative to
the optimal policy in terms of welfare, as expressed by (3.1). An additional
complication is that the policies we wish to rank do not imply convergence to the
same long-run outcomes. What we do in this paper is that we look at how well the
dynamics of our economy following the shock matches the dynamics of the optimal
economy following the same shock. In other words, we evaluate alternative rules
of the form (5.1) and (5.2) by comparing the impulse response functions these
rules generate vis-￿-vis the impulse responses of the optimal economy. We shall










where xt;T for x = ￿p;￿w;y is a column vector of realizations of variable x following
the baseline government spending shock between time t￿ when the shock occurs￿
and time T, which is set arbitrarily.12 In our analysis, we set T = 30, which
12As an extension of the analysis presented here, one could evaluate responses to a variety of
shocks by extending the vector IRt;T and possibly assign weights according to the importance
of each of the type of shocks in explaining business cycle variation. Having multiple types of
shocks would not a⁄ect the general discussion, as the additional disturbance terms would only
enter the analysis via the ￿ star￿variables in an additive fashion.
29provides a long enough time for our economy to converge to its new steady state

















that would describe the dynamics of the optimal economy following the same
shock. Let us further de￿ne





























Then we de￿ne the best policy in the family of policies characterized by (5.1) and




￿ is thus a weighted sum of squares of the di⁄erences in responses in price in￿ ation,
wage in￿ ation and output gap in period t following the government spending shock
under the simple policy speci￿cation (5.1) and (5.2) and under the ￿ timelessly
optimal￿policy. The weights are given by the importance assigned to stabilization
of each of the target variables in the policy objective (3.1).
5.2. Numerical results
In this section, we present the results of our search for the best calibration of
(5.1) and (5.2) in terms of (5.5). Given that we conduct our search in a four
dimensional space, the number of potential combinations of parameter values is
large at any level of discretization. We have therefore constrained our search.
30Search Parameter Interval Step
1 ￿￿￿￿w [0;10] 1
1 ￿￿￿￿p [0;10] 1
1 ￿y [0:5;10:5] 1
1 ￿ [0;0:3] 0:1
2 ￿￿￿￿w [5;10] 0:5
2 ￿￿￿￿p [0;5] 0:5
2 ￿y [0:5;10:5] 1
2 ￿ [0:05;0:2] 0:05
3 ￿￿￿￿w [3;10] 1
3 ￿￿￿￿p [0;7] 1
3 ￿y [0:5;7] 0:5
3 ￿ [0:05;0:3] 0:05
Table 5.1: Intervals for parameter value search
We looked for optimal parameter combinations on certain intervals of parameter
values. We have conducted the searches reported in Table 5.1, which gives the
interval size and the size of one step within the given interval.13 The intervals were
chosen after some preliminary random calibrations and also keeping in mind that
the resulting rule should have a practical appeal. All other structural parameters
in the model were calibrated as before. The parameter combinations we report all
satisfy the Blanchard-Kahn (1980) conditions for uniqueness and stability of the
results.
All of the reported three searches have selected the following calibration as
the one that provides the best ￿t with the optimal solution: ￿￿ = 10:0;￿￿p =
1:0;￿￿w = 0;￿y = 3:5 and ￿ = 0:20.14 The reported parameter values imply a
long-run response coe¢ cient of 1:40 at price in￿ ation and a long-run coe¢ cient
13The precision of our grid-search is limited by the available computer power.
14In this speci￿c case, the coe¢ cient at lagged wage in￿ ation in the targeting rule is zero.
Results obtained through a similar exercise for di⁄erent lengths of wage contract duration not
reported here have, however, included a positive ￿￿w: Hence the general formulation of (48).
31of 0:05 for wage in￿ ation in the reaction function for monetary policy. The long-
run response to the output gap is zero. Figure 5.1 below provides a sense of the
closeness of the dynamics generated by our targeting rule-based policy and the
optimal policy.15 Such a close match is unlikely to be provided by a pair of simple
instrument rules.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have extended the Benigno and Woodford (2003) economy
to include staggered wage adjustment. We have shown that preferences of the
policy maker can be characterized by a quadratic welfare objective involving wage
in￿ ation variability in addition to variability in price in￿ ation and the output
gap. We have shown that perfect stabilization of prices and/or wages is not a
desirable way of conducting policy, if at least one of the markets is subject to
nominal rigidity. We have learned that inclusion of nominal wage rigidity causes
the economy￿ s dynamics in response to shocks to become persistent even if shocks
themselves are non-persistent. The optimal dynamics of real wages is much less
cyclical compared with the sticky-price, ￿ exible-wage framework. The result that
public debt, tax rate and the output gap are all non-stationary carries over to an
economy with imperfect wage ￿ exibility.
We have proposed a pair of simple speci￿c targeting rules, one simple wage
in￿ ation rule and one real-wage-growth rule, that perform well in replicating the
dynamics of the optimal economy. We have selected ￿ desirable￿policies in the
family of policies de￿ned by these rules using a formal assessment of the match
between the dynamics of the economy induced by these rules and the optimal
15Should one consider multiple types of shocks, the ￿ desirable￿calibration of policy targets
would likely be a⁄ected and the close match with the optimal dynamics would only hold for the
shocks carrying higher weight. Nevertheless, the general concept would remain una⁄ected.
















































Figure 5.1: Dynamics of the economy under optimal and rule-based policy
33dynamics of the economy.
In Horvath (2007), we show that these rules perform similarly well under
di⁄erent calibrations of price and wage contract duration. For reasons explained in
Correia et al. (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2006a), the present framework
is not likely to provide useful results for economies with more complicated tax
structures, involving di⁄erent types of tax instruments that could be varied
independently of each other. The question of the links between the tax system
and the appropriate formulation of the targeting rules remains an interesting one
to explore further. In Horvath (2007), we have replicated the analysis presented
in this paper for an economy in which tax is on sales revenues rather than wage
income and found that optimal dynamics was best approximated by a pair of
speci￿c targeting rules in which the wage in￿ ation rule is replaced by a price
in￿ ation rule. Hence, when devising appropriate targeting-rule-based frameworks,
one also needs to examine carefully the link with the tax system in addition to
the dynamics of the supply side of the economy.
34References
[1] Aiyagari, S. R., A. Marcet, T. J. Sargent and J Seppala, 2002, Optimal
Taxation without State-Contingent Debt, Journal of Political Economy, vol.
110, no. 6, 1220-1254.
[2] Amato, J. D. and T. Laubach, 2003, Rule-of-Thumb Behaviour and Monetary
Policy, European Economic Review, 47, 791-831.
[3] Benigno, P. and M. Woodford, 2003, Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy:
A Linear-Quadratic Approach, in: Gertler, M. and K. Rogo⁄ (eds.), NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, 271-332.
[4] Benigno, P. and M. Woodford, 2004, Optimal Stabilization Policy When
Wages and Prices are Sticky: The Case of a Distorted Steaty State, NBER
Working Paper No.10839
[5] Benigno, P. and M. Woodford, 2006a, Optimal In￿ ation Targeting Under
Alternative Fiscal Regimes, NBER Working Paper No. 12158.
[6] Benigno, P. and M. Woodford, 2006b, Linear-Quadratic Approximation of
Optimal Policy Problems, NBER Working Paper No. 12672.
[7] Blanchard, O.J. and C.M. Kahn, 1980, The Solution of Linear Di⁄erence
Models under Rational Expectations, Econometrica, 48 (5), 1305-11.
[8] Calvo, G., 1983, Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximising Framework,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 383-98
[9] Chadha, J.S., N. Janssen and C. Nolan, 2000, An Examination of UK
Business Cycle Fluctuations: 1871-1997, Cambridge Working Papers in
Economics No. 0024.
35[10] Chadha, J.S., and C. Nolan, 2002, A Long View of the UK Business Cycle,
National Institute Economic Review, 182, 72-90.
[11] Christiano, L.J., M. Eichenbaum and C.L. Evans, 1997, Sticky Price and
Limited Participation Models of Money: A Comparison, European Economic
Review, 41, 1201-1249.
[12] Christiano, L.J., M. Eichenbaum and C. Evans, 1999, Monetary Policy
Shocks: What Have We Learned and to What End?, in: Taylor, J.B. and M.
Woodford (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1A, Elsevier
[13] Chugh, S.K., 2006, Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy with Sticky Wages
and Sticky Prices, Review of Economic Dynamics, 9, 683-714.
[14] Correia, I.H., J.P. Nicolini and P. Teles, 2003, Optimal Fiscal and Monetary
Policy: Equivalence Results, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3730
[15] Dixit, A. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1977, Monopolistic Competition and Optimal
Product Diversity, American Economic Review, 67, 297-308
[16] Erceg, C.J., D.W. Henderson and A.T. Levin, 2000, Optimal Monetary Policy
with Staggered Wage and Price Contracts, Journal of Monetary Economics,
46, 281-313.
[17] Evans, G.W. and S. Honkapohja, 2006, Monetary Policy, Expectations and
Commitment, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108 (1), 15-38.
[18] Horvath, M., 2007, Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Economies with
Multiple Distortions, Ph.D. Thesis, University of St Andrews.
36[19] King, R.G. and M. W. Watson, The Solution of Singular Linear Di⁄erence
Systems under Rational Expectations, International Economic Review, 39(4),
1015-1026.
[20] Levine, P. and D. Currie, 1987, The Design of Feedback Rules in Linear
Stochastic Rational Expectations Models, Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 11, 1-28.
[21] Lucas, R.E., 1986, Principles of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 17, 117-134.
[22] Lucas, R. E., Jr. and N. L. Stokey, 1983, Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy
in an Economy without Capital, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12: 55-93.
[23] Schmitt-GrohØ, S. and M. Uribe, 2004a, Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy
under Sticky Prices, Journal of Economic Theory, 114, 198-230.
[24] Schmitt-GrohØ, S. and M. Uribe, 2004b, Optimal Simple and Implementable
Monetary and Fiscal Rules, NBER Working Paper No. 10253, January
[25] Schmitt-GrohØ, S. and M. Uribe, 2005, Optimal Fiscal and Monetary
Policy in a Medium-Scale Macroeconomic Model: Expanded Version, NBER
Working Paper 11417.
[26] Siu, H.E., 2004, Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy with Sticky Prices,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 51, 575-607.
[27] Stock, J.H. and M.W. Watson, 1999, Business Cycle Fluctuations in US
Macroeconomic Time Series, in: Taylor, J.B. and M. Woodford (eds.),
Handbook of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, Volume 1, Chapter 1, 3-64.
37[28] Svensson, L. E. O., 2002, In￿ ation Targeting: Should it be Modeled as an
Instrument Rule or a Targeting Rule?, European Economic Review, 46, 771-
780.
[29] Svensson, L. E. O., 2003, What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment
in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules, Journal of Economic Literature,
41 (2), 426-447.
[30] Svensson, L.E.O. and M. Woodford, 2005, Implementing Optimal Policy
through In￿ ation-Forecast Targeting, in: Bernanke, B. and M. Woodford
(eds.), The In￿ ation-Targeting Debate, University of Chicago Press, 19-83.
[31] Woodford, M., 2003, Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of
Monetary Policy, Princeton University Press
38A. Appendix
We de￿ne the values of the coe¢ cients used in the text:
￿k =
(1 ￿ ￿k)(1 ￿ ￿￿k)
￿k (1 + !k"k)
for k = p;w
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